

**USAID/Haiti**

**Annual Report**

**FY 2004**

June 15, 2004

## **Please Note:**

The attached RESULTS INFORMATION is from the FY 2004 Annual Report and was assembled and analyzed by the country or USAID operating unit identified on the cover page.

The Annual Report is a "pre-decisional" USAID document and does not reflect results stemming from formal USAID review(s) of this document.

Related document information can be obtained from:  
USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse  
8403 Colesville Road, Suite 210  
Silver Spring, MD 20910  
Telephone: (301) 562-0641  
Fax: (301) 588-7787  
Email: [docorder@dec.cdie.org](mailto:docorder@dec.cdie.org)  
Internet: <http://www.dec.org>

Portions released on or after July 1, 2004

## Haiti

### Performance:

Background: Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. The country's socio-economic profile resembles that of the most destitute nations in the world. Life expectancy is 53. Literacy is between 48-52%. Average per-capita annual income hovers around \$400. Income distribution leaves 76 percent of the population living below the poverty line. Formal employment accounts for barely 200-250,000 jobs in a non-farm labor force of some 2 million. Rural Haitians crowd into the urban areas in search of non-existent jobs. The country's population of eight million could double by 2040. Desperate Haitians take to the high seas or flee into the Dominican Republic hoping to secure a better life. Annual remittances of approximately \$900 million appear to be a significant factor in allowing many Haitians to otherwise surviving intolerable conditions.

The present frustration with the GOH should be viewed in the context of recent history. In 1986, the 30-year regime of the Duvaliers ended and, after a popular referendum in 1987 ratified a progressive new Haitian Constitution, the populist cleric Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president in 1990. The following year, the young president was ousted by an army coup, halting innovation and democratic initiatives. With U.S. assistance, Aristide returned to the Presidency in 1994 and has been in power since then, albeit behind the scenes during the Presidency of his supporter, Rene Preval (1996-2001). During the Aristide decade, Haitians have struggled with limited success toward a pluralistic political system. Violent partisanship is the norm for political debate, with those in power tending toward authoritarianism and outsiders unable to form successful coalitions or assume the mantle of a working opposition. No real forum for public debate on national policy issues exists. Generally, in a democracy the prime forum for debate is expected to be parliament. Consequently, when the legislative elections of 2000 were flawed, positions were hardened and Aristide's reputation as a new type of Haitian leader discredited.

The subsequent political impasse caused by discredited parliamentary elections is now entering its fourth year. The executive has consolidated power at the expense of the judicial and legislative branches. Human rights violations, suppression of dissent and concerted efforts to intimidate the independent media all increased in 2003. There are mounting protests throughout the country and calls for President Aristide to resign. Growth in private investment has been discouraged by a lack of confidence both in the political process and the ability of the state to uphold the rule of law. At the same time international financial institutions that had reduced or terminated their programs following the election have begun to reengage with the GOH out of a growing concern for the humanitarian situation and because of renewed of compliance with free market economic principles on the part of Aristide's government. Since the Government cleared its arrears to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in July, the IDB has activated almost \$196 million in suspended loans, and approved another \$200 million in new loans. Furthermore, there has been progress toward completion of a twelve-month IMF Staff Monitored Program (SMP). Thus while the political situation is dire, in the face of organizing opposition and violent protests, the GOH is trying to shore up support from the international financing institutions. The Government has shown less political will in responding to the demands of the Organization of the American States Resolution 822.

Haiti's economy stagnated in FY 2003. GDP increased by 0.7 percent, a decline of 1.3 percent per capita. Exports increased by six percent and imports by 10 percent. Inflation was 42 percent in 2003 and the currency lost almost 50 percent of its value relative to the U.S. dollar, adding to a 14 percent decline in 2002. Foreign direct investment was one percent of GDP in 2003 and net international reserves are \$42 million, barely enough to cover two weeks' imports. In addition, the deteriorating condition of Haiti's infrastructure has serious economic consequences. The majority of micro-enterprises is commercial and relies of the resale of goods. Transport is a major element of their total costs. The condition of the road

system more than doubles the cost of moving goods. As transporters have realized the losses they are incurring, their prices have risen dramatically. The purchasing power of the small entrepreneur and customers cannot keep pace. Some areas, particularly the South and Central Departments, rely completely on roads for the movement of goods and consequently are more severely affected. The lack of electric power is another serious economic constraint. The problem is not a matter of expense. Power is simply unavailable on a regular basis at a constant voltage during regular working hours. The state owned company supplying Port-au-Prince captures payment for about 40% of the power it produces, losing the rest to illegal connections, unpaid accounts, employee theft and transmission inefficiencies. Some urban areas outside of the capital rely on private providers and are better served. Large-scale improvements in Haiti's infrastructure will have to come from significantly greater private investment and to a lesser extent, from IFI resources.

Social services, to the extent that they are available, depend largely on the growing number of Haitian and international NGOs and on donor funding. The GOH has never attempted to meet the demand for universal grade school education. Approximately 80% of all primary and secondary schools are either run by religiously-affiliated NGOs or are private, for profit institutions. In health service delivery, USAID and a network of NGOs prop-up a struggling public health system, over time piecing together a growing ability to provide health care to the most vulnerable of Haiti's people, especially mothers and children. In agriculture and environmental protection, government funds for production-enhancing interventions are extremely limited. NGOs carry out a wide variety of programs in environmental protection and resource management, but given the enormity of the degradation of the resource base, the only hope is to stop further deterioration. USAID's successful Hillside Agriculture Project, which grows high-value tree crops for export in an environmentally sound way, offers one of the few rays of hope in an otherwise bleak production picture.

**U.S. Interests and Goals:** U.S. foreign policy interests in Haiti are poverty alleviation, democracy strengthening, decreasing narcotics trafficking and limiting illegal migration. USAID/Haiti program directs its resources to the poorest elements in Haitian society. Activities focus on health improvement, employment, self-help and income generation, all of which have a direct bearing on U.S. policy interests. The functional deterioration of Haiti's government has dictated the need for USAID to change its program significantly in recent years, halting direct support to public institutions and increasing involvement at the grass roots level. In the place of previous programs aimed at strengthening the country's police, judiciary, and elections machinery, for example, newer programs channel resources to private health care providers, farmer groups, agricultural exporters, private entities in the micro-enterprise sector, and local democracy and human rights groups. However, we still work closely with public institutions in the health sector. In fact we are currently expanding this cooperation, particularly in HIV/AIDS-under the President's Emergency Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Fighting the HIV/AIDS pandemic is another top U.S. government priority. By using the USAID created NGO health network, our pre-existing relationship with the Ministry of Health and by forming a new partnership with the Center for Disease Control, USAID will expand services to fully support this U.S. policy.

**Donor Relations:** USAID is an active member of the donors' group and has de facto leadership in a number of sectors. USAID often takes the lead in determining the agenda for the group and has formed a subcommittee of the more active donors to work on issues of mutual concern. Sub-groups for Health, Education and Humanitarian Assistance also meet frequently to exchange technical information and coordinate activities. Many of the bilateral donors ceased programming after the 2000 elections; however, this trend is slowly being reversed. External donor assistance to Haiti increased by 50% percent last year to about \$210 million (vs. \$160 million in FY 2001 and \$140 million in FY 2002). The U.S. provided more than a third of this, followed by the IDB, the United Nations agencies, and Taiwan. The health sector received most of the assistance, with a particular focus on HIV/AIDS, followed by education and humanitarian assistance. Assistance from the international financial institutions (IFIs) has resumed and will probably expand further in the event the GOH makes significant progress in meeting the conditions of OAS Resolution 822, continues implementing successfully the Staff-Monitored Program with the IMF and clears its arrears to the World Bank. If these events take place, more than \$800 million in additional IFI assistance could flow between now and 2006.

Challenges: Significant civil unrest is taking place in Haiti as the country enters 2004, the bicentennial of its independence. Without a softening in partisan lines and improved governance, Haiti could experience a sustained period of political instability, popular unrest, growing lawlessness and violence. Third parties are attempting to broker improved relations. A proposal by Catholic Bishops for a national government of reconciliation is being discussed; President Aristide has said he will consider it. The U.S. Mission to Haiti also is playing an active role in renewed attempts to get opposing parties to step back from the brink. These efforts could lead finally to new parliamentary elections but, if they do occur, it is unlikely that they will be held until late 2004 at the earliest.

USAID challenges in the face of this turmoil are to help Haitians deal with political differences peacefully, develop their economy, create jobs, protect the environment, and provide better education and health for their families. While the U.S. Government must continue to implement short-term measures to counter the threats of trafficking in narcotics and persons -- including illegal migrants -- through and from Haiti, such threats will only diminish or cease in the long-term if sustainable solutions are found to Haiti's chronic problems. The number of Haitians falling beneath the poverty line has risen from 70 to 76% of the population in the past two years. Without a greater influx of private investment and the subsequent creation of jobs, which can not happen until a stable political climate exist, Haitians will continue to be dependent on remittances, the large charitable contributions of faith-based organizations, help from a growing NGO community and the assistance of international donors and IFIs. A high prevalence of HIV/AIDS (4.5 country-wide, but higher in urban areas and growing the fastest amongst young people) presents another development challenge. In addition, Haiti is subject to natural disasters. A cycle of drought which affects the North and Central Plateau has brought about chronic food shortages in those areas. Each hurricane season threatens Haiti to a greater degree than its Caribbean neighbors because it lacks coping and response mechanisms.

Key Achievements: FY 2003 was a year of solid progress for USAID's program in Haiti. While we have met major targets in all sectors, perhaps our greatest success has been in the economic growth program that has increased farmers' incomes and agricultural productivity through improved crop quality and yield; improved market access for farmers and artisans through the development of new export and local marketing channels; and continued expansion of micro-entrepreneurs' access to credit. USAID has made progress in promoting democracy and civil society growth particularly at the local level, even though resources for democracy and governance activities are constrained. We have expanded our human rights promotion activities - protecting the rights of children at risk (e.g., from trafficking and AIDS), victims of organized violence, and of journalists and other members of civil society. Our health program continued to have national impact on infectious diseases, family planning and child survival. In addition the Mission has assumed a leading position in starting up PEPFAR activities. Our P.L. 480 program has supported the entire program, but most positively is helping to achieve mother and child nutrition objectives.

1. Economic Growth: USAID fostered the production and export of high-value fruit and tree crops which significantly increased small-farmer income and protect the hillside environment. Last year these programs increased the revenues for more than 35,000 farmers of targeted crops, and in the case of mango production, increased farm gate prices by as much as 44%. FY 2003 exports of the USAID supported Haitian Bleu coffee met all quality requirements and attracted interest from new distributors in Japan and Europe. Our promotion of cacao production led to a 14% increase in farm-gate prices and to M&M Mars committing to a new long-term collaboration with HAP-supported cacao growers. USAID assistance to Haitian artisans has helped them regain a predominant position in the Caribbean for marketing and exporting handicrafts. USAID continued to expand a micro-lending industry that now provides credit to nearly 80,000 borrowers, more than 80 percent of whom are women.

2. Democracy: In democracy USAID strengthened the independent media and expanded a community radio network broadcasting civic awareness programs. The program building coalitions for judicial reform was expanded to incorporate human rights promotion objectives and the program for developing political parties gained momentum after a slow start. In addition, in FY 2003 we began anti-corruption activities and a project to combat trafficking of children.

3. Health: USAID has built a network of some 29 local NGO service providers to reach approximately

one-third of Haiti's population (2.6 million people) with basic primary care and child survival services. This extensive network increased access to a broad range of health services, and a mix of modern family planning methods -- including an expanded very effective natural family planning program -- and maternal health care. This NGO network has enabled the rapid scale-up of HIV/AIDS activities by marrying USAID implementation experience with the CDC's expertise in laboratory services and research. Integration of health service delivery with PEPFAR activities ensures that the overall network will be strengthened and sustainable. In addition, USAID formed new partnerships with faith-based and other volunteer health organizations interested in assisting Haiti. A USAID-sponsored Health Summit held in 2003 demonstrated that such partnerships have the potential to greatly expand health service delivery.

4. Education: USAID/Haiti's assistance in education, focused on improving the quality of primary education through up-grading the skills of teachers and school directors, providing materials and equipment and strengthening NGOs, community schools and parent/teacher associations, did not fully meet targets this year. However, mechanisms were put in place to insure that portions of the program which have been successful, such as the Save the Children Community Schools, will serve as the basis for future education programming.

USAID/Haiti also administered the P.L.480 Title II food program which is key to meeting humanitarian needs and reduced food insecurity in areas of the country hard-hit economically. Food, distributed through maternal-child health facilities to children under five and nursing and/or pregnant mothers and to children enrolled in primary schools, supports USAID health and education activities. In addition to direct food distribution, the program sold the bulk of food commodities to finance projects in health care, primary education, agriculture and to provide a safety net for orphans, the elderly and physically disabled. Particularly successful this year was the introduction of seed banks that reduced food insecurity in drought prone areas. These programs are managed by CARE International, Catholic Relief Services, Save the Children and World Vision.

Gender considerations are central to USAID/Haiti's program. The USAID funded dramas broadcasted on community radio feature women's rights and women's support messages. Approximately 80% of micro-credit recipients are women; an underlying emphasis of the education activity is to enroll more girls and the family planning program gives women more control over their reproductive health.

## **Country Close and Graduation:**

### Strategic Objective Closeout Report for 521-002: Environmental Degradation Slowed

#### Background

Before 1999, USAID/Haiti's environmental and agricultural initiatives had been combined into one strategic objective in which deforestation and soil erosion were the primary focus. In 1999, in response to the accelerated degradation of the environment and the need for a broader range of new environmental activities, the Mission created a Strategic Objective entitled: SO2 Environmental Degradation Slowed. The objective of this SO was to slow down environmental degradation by strengthening environmental institutions and policies, developing alternate sources of energy, and promoting sustainable agricultural practices, including agro-forestry and reforestation. In 1997, the Mission had consolidated all its agricultural and environmental activities in a single operational program: Agriculturally Sustainable Systems and Environmental Transformation (ASSET). With the creation of SO2, ASSET continued as the umbrella program that addressed the Mission's Strategic Objectives in both agriculture and the environment: Sustainable Increase Income for the Poor (SO1) and Environmental Degradation Slowed (SO2). This program combined the continuation of successful activities for the environment, income generation, and new initiatives derived from lessons learned from more than 20 years of experience. These methodologies have produced a menu of environmentally-sound technologies and have proved effective in Haiti's fragile agriculture system. The environment component of ASSET, implemented by Winrock International, was intended to promote broad-based, environmentally-sound, sustainable economic growth while also addressing fundamental factors that have led to the environmental degradation of Haiti. Ultimately, its purpose was to develop a model of local community management of a strategic watershed. ASSET was also to make a discernible impact on natural resource management at the farmer level by helping to create the policy environment and the institutions necessary to support these improvements. Contract number 521-0257-C-00-7025 for the ASSET program was signed by Winrock International and USAID/Haiti on March 31, 1997, and was implemented in the upper reaches of two neighboring watersheds, the "Riviere Grise" and the "Riviere Blanche," known as Belle-Fontaine watershed located primarily in the Communes of Croix-des-Bouquets and Kenscoff in Haiti. The ASSET program ended on October 31, 2002.

#### Basic Identifying Information

The Agriculturally Sustainable Systems and Environmental Transformation (ASSET) program had four main results as defined into the contract document:

Result 1: Strengthened national framework for environmentally-sound development

Result 2: Increased use of sustainable hillside agricultural practice

Result 3: Increased community participation in tree planting and protection of productive infrastructure

Result 4: Improved environmental quality in targeted urban locations.

Winrock was only responsible for the implementation of results 1, 3 and 4. Result 2 is still being implemented by another contractor under the Hillside Agriculture Program (HAP). During the project's five-plus years, fourteen contractual amendments reflected changes in USAID's approach and its relationship with the GOH, as well as reductions in congressional funding each fiscal year. In 1999, as the new Strategic Plan identified new strategic objectives, the Performance Monitoring Plan was modified as well. In the third year of project implementation, USAID shifted focus, discontinued the urban environment component of the program, and cancelled the project's component devoted to the development of a national agricultural and environmental monitoring information system.

During a seven-month project extension, ASSET put heightened emphasis on building the capacity of Belle Fontaine community groups to sustain local watershed management activities following project closeout in 2002. The project worked with communities to develop local environmental action plans, and the project's Environmental Management Fund provided small grants to assist in the implementation of

these plans and the completion of infrastructure activities, especially cistern construction and road rehabilitation. ASSET also provided consultant support to the Haitian Environmental Foundation to ensure that its financial and administrative systems were in compliance with USAID requirements, and helped finalize the foundation's grant-making procedures. In the last quarter of 2000, a team from USAID and the U.S. Forest Service carried out a project assessment focused mainly on ASSET activities in the watershed management area, and in December 2001, a team composed of USAID/Washington, USAID/Haiti, the U.S. Forest Services and consultants carried out another project assessment.

## Importance

Haiti, once a lush tropical country, has lost much of its agricultural and marine production potential, and has begun a process of desertification. Less than 2% of Haiti's natural forest remains, and 25 of its 30 watersheds are denuded. This deforestation of Haiti's mountainous countryside has resulted in extensive soil erosion, washing away approximately 15,000 acres of topsoil each year; scarce rainfall carries away the land it could have enriched. This imposes intolerable limits on agricultural productivity and economic possibilities for the 70% of Haiti's population for whom agriculture provides a major source of income, causing strategic infrastructures, such as dams, irrigation canals, and roads to lose some of their useful life. The Cul-de-Sac aquifer, which provides water to two million inhabitants in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, is dangerously low, and the coastal marine ecosystems are also being destroyed and are losing their recycling and productive capacity. Inadequate or non-existing sewage systems threaten health and pollute the aquifer.

Through USAID support in the environmental sector over the past six years, the Strategic Objective: Environmental Degradation Slowed fostered improvement in public policies and institutions to promote conservation and sustainable utilization of natural resources and reverse the trend for Haiti to become the first "eco-catastrophe" country in the Western Hemisphere. This program helped clarify roles and responsibilities of various ministries with environmental and natural resources management through the development of Haiti's first environmental action plan. The establishment of the Haitian Environmental Foundation as a financial mechanism to address Haiti's most crucial environmental problems should bear fruit for the upcoming decades.

## The Results

Notable successes of the ASSET program include:

- Complete development of the National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP). The main objective of the NEAP is to provide an environmental policy framework that includes short to long-term interventions by civil society, government and donors.
- Increased capacity within community, civil society, non-governmental organizations (NGO) and local organizations. The project helped in the creation of the Haitian Environmental Foundation, a non-partisan organization that brings together stakeholders to identify and prioritize Haiti's key environmental issues, and facilitate discussions and actions toward resolving these issues. Thirty community-led groups are resolving environmental problems in target regions, and twelve land use management plans have been developed.
- Increased community participation in tree planting and protection of productive infrastructure. One and a half million of trees have survived, 9,000 trees grafted, 360 market gardens established, 156 hectares of forage grasses established, 890 gully plugs installed, 3,653 hectares of land in selected areas are under improved Natural Resources Management practices, 1,541 farmers using at least one improved agricultural practice, 3 sustainable models of catchments rehabilitation developed and functioning and 6 replicated in priority catchments. The energy-efficient activity produced over 50,000 household and commercial stoves. This energy component is being continued under the Sustainable Increase Income for the Poor SO.
- Ten water catchment systems constructed, 8 springs capped, 181 cisterns constructed and operational.



The ASSET program met nearly all of its targets, was implemented on-budget and received two technical evaluations from USAID, USFS, and international consultants and an audit (Fund Accountability Statement from March 31, 1997 through October 31, 2002), despite it having been a very complicated project with 14 contractual modifications, implemented in a very remote area and during a very difficult political time.

#### The disbursements

The program lasted 5 years and seven months, for a total cost of \$16.5 million. Funds were obligated as follows:

\$16 million -Contract with Winrock International

\$3,931,086 -Sub-Contract with the International Resource Group (IRG) for Result 2

\$868,500 -Sub-contract with Datex

\$550,000 -Sub-grant to the Haitian Environmental Foundation for its establishment

\$250,000 -CARE/Haiti for efficient stove project

#### Other Donors and Implementing Partners

USAID was the main donor funding major watershed rehabilitation in Haiti. UNDP and the World Bank did however provide support to the development of the National Environmental Action Plan.

#### CARE/Haiti

CARE received a grant under the ASSET/Winrock contract to develop prototype of energy-saving stoves for curbside food vendors in Port-au-Prince and the secondary cities

#### International Resources Group, Inc. (IRG)

The management of Winrock International entered into a cost-reimbursable subcontract, No. 5014-97-1, with IRG under ASSET to provide technical assistance, training, grants funds and management to support increased community participation in tree planting and protection of productive infrastructure

#### Datex, Inc.

Datex, Inc. signed a cost-reimbursable subcontract, No. 5014-97-2, under the ASSET/Winrock program to provide technical assistance, training and management support to the Ministries of Agriculture and of Environment to put in place a national agricultural and environmental information system, and to improve the environmental quality in targeted urban areas. Total obligated funds through September 30, 1999 are \$868,500, after which the component was terminated.

#### Government of Haiti (GOH)

The Government of Haiti (GOH) was not a direct recipient of funds. However, every effort was made to keep the GOH informed of the status of the program and 161 ministry staff received training. An advisory committee was formed of several key ministries, including Agriculture and Environment.

#### Local and other International Partners

Between December 1997 and October 2002, USAID/Haiti approved the following sub-agreements under its Contract with Winrock International:

- Foundation for the Protection of Marine Biodiversity (FoProBim), through a grant mechanism and technical assistance to conduct research and surveys for the understanding of the interactions between the watershed and the coastal marine ecosystems and to know about the status of the coral reefs along the Arcadins Coast.

- The Haitian Environmental Foundation

UNDP provided seed money to help launch the preparations for the National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP), whose development USAID then supported with an additional \$750,000.

#### Performance Indicators Used

The Strategic Objective SO2 “Environmental Degradation Slowed,” under which the ASSET/Winrock program was authorized, had two main intermediate results (IRs).

#### SO level Intermediate Results (IRs)

- Sustainable Energy Options used
- Civil Society and Government implementing environmental solutions

#### Summary of Impact and Lessons Learned

The end-of-project lessons learned workshop, which included community representatives, donor representatives, USAID/Jamaica’s Ridge-to-Reef Watershed Program representatives, project staffs and international consultants, generated several lessons learned.

**Social Capital:** Workshop participants clearly identified local institutional development as the critical element of success. Aside from the obvious importance of local ownership of project goals and activities, training and animation support were essential and more should have been provided. Support for community organization skills, serious attention to local organization arrangements, and technical assistance for institutional development should have been on a par with other forms of technical and infrastructure development assistance. Institutional development was a necessary condition for sustainable operation and management of new forms of “commons”- collectively-owned water catchment structures that created new supply of water; a scarce and valuable resource could potentially be subject to conflict over access and equitable distribution. Looking back, it is clear that the project invested more heavily in the development of these infrastructures than in the local social and political institutions required to manage them. In contrast, the household-and-yard (Lakou) cisterns tended to fit more directly with traditional private property arrangements, extended families ties, and traditional forms of resource sharing linked to family ties and obligations.

**Partnership and contrasting expectations:** ASSET incorporated local farmers into its 1997 workshop to launch the project, and local farmers actively participated throughout the closeout workshop on lessons learned. Exchange visits and coordination to create opportunities for dialogue between projects have also proven to be useful.

**Timing of activities:** A notable lesson is the crucial importance of timing and sequence in program activities. In retrospect, there was a problem of phasing in ASSET/Winrock activities. In some respects, project activities were not properly synchronized. The problem was in part an artifact of the ambitious nature of the original project design. The project was slated to have a significant national impact on the environment, dramatic landscape level changes, and identifiable impact on the disastrous scale of erosion affecting Port-au-Prince and its water supply. The project was eventually scaled down to more manageable levels with more limited goals and expectations.

**Exit strategy:** The utility of an exit strategy is an important lesson from ASSET/Winrock experience. Ideally, exit strategy should be developed early in the partnership process with local participating organizations. It should be also reviewed and discussed with partners at later stages of project implementation to assure that community expectations are not higher than the project can fulfill. Clearly, a plan for post-project transition should support sustainability and post-project continuity.

**Management:** Management of ASSET/Winrock was complicated by widely divergent objectives in early stages of the project, a midcourse hiatus in funding, and repeated revisions to the scope of work. Project management was also complicated by lack of continuity of key personnel, and internal contractual arrangements that tended to separate authority from responsibility. In its later phases, the project’s elaborate administrative apparatus, built up in early stages of project implementation, was out of proportion to its more narrowly defined focus on watershed management in Belle Fontaine. This contributed to an imbalance between the administrative support role, operating from the top down, and the technical and team management requirements of field operations. In retrospect, it’s evident that complicated projects such as ASSET/Winrock should assign high priority to team building in early stages of project implementation.

## **Results Framework**

### **521-001 Sustainable Increased Income for the Poor**

#### **SO Level Indicator(s):**

- Ind. 1: Value of targeted agricultural and artisanal production
- Ind. 2: Value of outstanding loans to targeted micro-entrepreneurs

**IR 1.1** Increased Environmentally Sustainable Agricultural Income

**IR 1.2** Small and Micro-Entrepreneurs Economically Empowered

**IR 1.3** Civil society/Farmers Groups Strengthened

### **521-002 Environmental Degradation Slowed**

### **521-003 Healthier Families of Desired Size**

#### **SO Level Indicator(s):**

- Ind. 1: Total fertility rate
- Ind. 2: Infant Mortality rate
- Ind. 3: Prevalence of malnutrition in children under five
- Ind. 4: Prevalence of HIV in group 15-24 years

**IR 3.1** Increased use of quality child survival (CS) and nutrition services

**IR 3.2** Increased use of quality reproductive health (RH) services

**IR 3.3** Reduced transmission of selected infectious diseases

### **521-004 Increased human capacity**

#### **SO Level Indicator(s):**

- Ind. 1: Promotion rates of primary school students

**IR 4.1** Improved quality of primary education

**IR 4.2** Improved policy framework for private/public sector partnership

**IR 4.3** Improved education services for Out-of school youth

### **521-005 Genuinely Inclusive Democratic Governance Attained**

#### **SO Level Indicator(s):**

- Ind. 1: Number of civil organization advocating for policy reform

**IR 5.1** Civil society organizations positively influence policies

**IR 5.2** People increasingly treated according to the rule of law

### **521-006 Streamlined Government**

### **521-007 Police Better Protect and Serve Haitians Nationwide**

### **521-009 Hurricane Georges Recovery**

### **521-XXX Economic Growth**

### **521-YYY Health Systems**

### **521-ZZZ Education**